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The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, told the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York on 27 September 1962: 
The latest estimate that has been made of the casualties in the first 
exchange in a nuclear world is over 300 million people dead in the first 
few days….and I would add to that unpleasant fact this, that there is the 
near certainty that local conflicts which draw in the Great Powers could 
not possibly be confined to wars with conventional weapons. We might 
try to do so, but with the best will in the world you cannot, with one kind 
of equipment, fight another kind of war.2  
The immediate relevance of these words was not grasped, even by the speaker 
himself. However, exactly one month later back in London, Lord Home spent 
the anxious weekend of 27-28 October 1962 contemplating the Armageddon he 
had sketched out. In the interim, the crisis that unfolded in Cuba was to test to 
the limit his hypothesis of escalation. To prevent a process he had warned as 
nigh inevitable, it also prompted Home and others to explore the tension-
resolving capabilities of the UN itself. 
This dimension of the Cuban Missile Crisis has not heavily featured in the 
voluminous literature on the subject, and still less in discussion of the British 
role in these events. Although the UN had a high profile throughout the public 
phase of the crisis prompted by the American discovery that the Soviets had 
deployed long-range missiles on the island, its activity was downplayed in 
subsequent accounts.3 Similarly, the local nature of the conflict, which the 
Soviets had every interest in emphasizing, has been downplayed by their 
American counterparts. Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in his subsequent 
justification of his actions to the Supreme Soviet, presented the origins of the 
crisis as a response to American aggression against the revolutionary 
government Fidel Castro established in Cuba in January 1959: ‘They broke off 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, have conducted and are conducting subversive 
activity and established an economic blockade of Cuba.’4 The risk of American 
invasion was discussed at length with his senior colleague, Anastas Mikoyan, 
the First Deputy Prime Minister, who conducted a very successful visit to Cuba 
in February 1960. Shortly after this visit, the Americans began planning what 
became the Bay of Pigs episode of April 1961. Khrushchev’s response was to 
ship rockets and Il-28 bombers to Cuba.5  
Castro’s government had unsuccessfully sought the sympathy of the UN 
Security Council against US threats since July 1960, most recently in February 
1962 after the Americans prompted the Organisation of American States [OAS] 
the previous month to declare Communism incompatible with the Western 
Hemisphere, effectively expelling Cuba.6 One of the statesmen to follow Home 
to the General Assembly podium during the 17th Assembly meetings that 
autumn was Cuban President Dorticós. The British delegation noted that he 
‘devoted almost all of his long, histrionic and intemperate speech to an attack on 
United States policy towards Cuba’. Denouncing the US base at Guantanamo 
and American violations of Cuban waters and airspace he declared that if the 
US would guarantee Cuban territorial integrity ‘Cuba would have no need of 
arms’. Otherwise, he ominously added, Cuba ‘would resist if attacked, for she 
did not stand alone.’7 
In contrast, it was in the American interest to play up the missile launch sites 
first conclusively uncovered on 14 October 1962 as an act of Soviet aggression 
which changed the security of the Western Hemisphere. After all, the Soviets 
fraudulently claimed not to have any such bases outside their own territory.8 
Indeed, although satellite pictures obtained by the Americans from 1961 
onwards had indicated the hollowness of such claims, the Soviets boasted that 
their missile capacity was such that they did not need them.9  
The Americans did not publicly reveal their discovery either to their public or 
the world until 22 October. U Thant, the Acting Secretary-General of the UN, 
learnt of the missiles from his military adviser, the Indian General Indar Jit 
Rikhye, on 20 October. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was not 
officially notified until late the following evening.10 In the interim, on 16 
October, exercising his right of reply to Dorticós, the US representative at the 
UN, Adlai Stevenson, sought to refute for the fourth time the Cuban allegations. 
He drew attention to the flood of Soviet weapons and technicians into Cuba and 
Castro’s avowed intention to subvert Western Hemisphere governments. 
American warnings of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba had already elicited 
unanimous support – even from the normally more neutralist Brazil and Mexico 
– at the OAS on 2 October 1962. US counter-measures, Stevenson maintained, 
were therefore protective, as he assured ‘The US will not commit aggression 
against Cuba.’11 
Once they choose to reveal the Soviet deployment, the Americans portrayed this 
as an act of aggression. The crisis was thereafter acted out as a confrontation 
between Kennedy and Khrushchev, with Cuba serving as the setting for the 
contest. As the British ambassador to Washington, David Ormsby-Gore, acutely 
observed, ‘The whole American case is built upon the fact that this is a clear 
challenge by the Soviet Union and that Castro is a mere cypher in this game.’12 
As tension built over the next few days the focus of world attention inevitably 
became the relationship between these two principals. Both at the time and 
subsequently, the story of these days has been told – especially from the 
American side – as one of brinkmanship and blinking between an implacable 
and a more malleable protagonist. 
The gradual way in which details of the events of October 1962 subsequently 
emerged reinforced the apparent gladiatorial nature of the crisis and diminished 
the significance of other dimensions. Early revelations, such as Theodore 
Sorensen’s ghost-written and misleading presentation of the President’s 
brother’s experience of the crisis in Thirteen Days,13 emphasized the crisis as a 
stand-off between Kennedy and Khrushchev. This interpretation shaped 
subsequent analyses, reaching an apogee in Dino Brugioni’s Eyeball to Eyeball 
(1991).14 It also impacted on British reflections on their experience of these 
events. Stung by contemporary allegations of lack of influence Macmillan, for 
instance, used his memoirs primarily to demonstrate his extensive contacts with 
Kennedy during the crisis.15 This historiography has obscured the important role 
ascribed to the UN in British attempts to reduce tensions.  
Macmillan at least makes extensive reference to the UN, unlike most American 
memoirists and commentators. Indeed, careful reading of his chapter on the 
crisis, ‘On the Brink’, suggests that there was another central character to the 
drama, since his pages are populated by repeated references to U Thant.16 The 
Acting Secretary-General came to office on 3 November 1961 in difficult 
circumstances. The Congo civil war had claimed the life of his predecessor, Dag 
Hammarskjöld – killed in an air crash just outside Ndola in September 1961 – 
and over-stretched its finances, particularly because the Soviet bloc refused to 
provide funds towards UN operations there. U Thant had to supervise a bond 
issue to address immediate financial problems. Meanwhile, Russian demands 
for what they called a Troika arrangement meant they were unwilling to see 
Hammarskjöld replaced except on an interim basis. Instead, arguing that the UN 
was dominated by Western interests (amongst whom they included 
Hammarskjöld, who allegedly surrounded himself with American advisers) they 
called for three parallel Secretaries-General, respectively to represent the West, 
the Communist world and the burgeoning African-Asian contingent of non-
aligned and newly-independent countries steadily growing in importance in the 
UN. U Thant himself represented the latter, having been as his country’s 
ambassador to the UN part of the Burmese delegation to the conference of 
neutral countries in Belgrade in September 1961.17  
Macmillan clearly saw U Thant as less dynamic than Hammarskjöld.18 
Accounts of the Congo crisis rightly ascribe to the latter a central role. U Thant 
was much less combative. A Canadian appreciation the Foreign Office’s United 
Nations Department clearly found perceptive observed,  
We doubt if he would ever respond to Soviet charges in the forthright 
manner adopted by Hammarskjold….his observations of the effect on the 
[UN] organization of Hammarskjold’s fight with USSR, added to his own 
experience as a neutralist representative and his own character, will 
incline him to avoid if possible a direct confrontation as a matter of 
policy. 
The Canadian ambassador to the UN, C. S. A. Ritchie, continued: ‘There can be 
no comparing the intellectual capacity of U Thant and Hammarskjöld.’ 
However, instead of Hammarskjöld’s talent for inventive problem-solving, U 
Thant was deemed likely to favour delicate diplomacy.19 Hammarskjöld was the 
more overtly activist interpreter of his office, using Article 99 to bring the 
Congo crisis to the Security Council in May 1960.20 In the crisis of October 
1962, however, arguably it was U Thant’s capacity for delicate diplomacy that 
was more needed.  
British briefing papers for Anglo-American talks on 9-10 July 1962 concluded 
that ‘U Thant has shown himself to be an effective, independent and co-
operative Secretary-General.’ The Americans and French apparently concurred. 
Because of his neutralist background, it was also hoped that making his 
appointment permanent would defeat the Troika proposals. He was indeed seen 
as the only viable candidate to do so. This did not mean that U Thant 
necessarily wanted the position. The Americans clearly thought that he did, 
telling their British counterparts that he was campaigning vigorously.21 British 
diplomats, in contrast, were more inclined to note his references to 
homesickness.22 Nevertheless, the fact that in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis 
he skilfully manoeuvred himself into being unanimously elected as Secretary-
General on his own terms on 30 November 1962 and then stayed in post until 
1971 suggests that U Thant was not as reluctant a holder of that office as he 
sometimes made out. He was, however, self-effacing in a way which might 
explain his low profile in accounts of the Cuban crisis. Indeed, aware of the 
continuing Russian hankering after the Troika arrangements, he diplomatically 
avoided all references to Cuba in his acceptance speech.23 
U Thant had not anticipated that Cuba would bulk so large during the 17th 
Assembly of the UN convened in New York in September 1962. Neither had 
the British appreciated this possibility. Instead, their delegation under Sir 
Patrick Dean expected to concentrate on responding to Afro-Asian criticisms of 
Southern Rhodesia and Oman or to the Venezuelan revival of border claims 
with British Guiana. Home nevertheless spent much of his speech to the 
General Assembly warning of the confrontation with a Communism bent on 
imposing its will upon the world, most apparently in the border clashes between 
China and India which were to flare to full-scale war on 20 October. This was 
the context for the Foreign Secretary’s only mention of Cuba, in which he 
responded to the speech to the same audience of his Soviet opposite number, 
Andrei Gromyko, on 22 September 1962. Gromyko, he warned, before 
preaching self-determination for Cuba, should look to the failure to allow it 
within his own country, or amongst satellite countries such as East Germany. 
More positively, Home focused on the prospects for agreement with the Soviets 
on banning nuclear tests, and on the recent settlement in Laos.24 Laos and Berlin 
were indeed the only subjects under discussion during Home’s meeting with 
Gromyko in New York.25 That Cuba was much more central to the latter was, 
however, apparent both from his speech and from his reiteration of its themes in 
his press conference of 13 October.26 
Although a British delegate observed, ‘The Communist speeches all make Cuba 
their main propaganda theme’, that there might be ulterior motives behind this 
rhetorical offensive was apparently not suspected.27 This is despite the similar 
concentration in Soviet propaganda outlets.28 Meanwhile in London a number 
of known Communist front and fellow-travelling organisations wrote to the 
Foreign Office condemning American aggression in Cuba. This culminated in a 
rebuffed request for a delegation to the Prime Minister from the hitherto 
unknown Britain-Cuba Committee on 11 October.29  
That more notice was not taken of these developments may be because the 
British did not fully share American concerns about the Cuban regime. On the 
day of his UN speech Home nevertheless asked Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of 
State, how the British might help. Rusk inquired if Britain could apply the rules 
on trading with the Soviet bloc against Cuba. On 1 October in Washington, 
Kennedy went further, trying to persuade the Foreign Secretary to join the 
American trade embargo that commenced in October 1959. Home had, 
however, just been instructed by Macmillan that ‘There is no reason for us to 
help the Americans on Cuba’.30 The Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
Joseph Godber, indeed warned that American tactics would ‘merely force 
Castro to depend more and more completely on the Soviet Union’, thus helping 
him to ‘consolidate his position by building up hatred against the West’. The 
British were, in any case, of the view that there was no point in raising domestic 
political problems through an unprecedented peacetime embargo when their 
exports to Cuba were already minute. 
Furthermore, American anxieties about Cuba were seen as exaggerated. Godber 
concluded: ‘We have, of course, been used to living for a long time now with 
Communism on our doorstep. We understand and sympathise with the 
regrettable fact that the United States now has a similar experience.’ However, 
ironically in view of subsequent events, his view was that ‘No-one would insult 
the United States by thinking that Cuba represents a military threat against 
her.’31 
Finally, Cuba may not have resonated with the British at the UN because the 
Americans had hitherto handsomely won any General Assembly votes about 
Cuba. This issue was therefore deemed unlikely to be inscribed for more 
detailed discussion in the General Assembly’s committees.32 Such processes, 
often culminating in critical plenary resolutions, could be embarrassing before 
the bar of world opinion, as the British were found over Southern Rhodesia at 
this session. Inscription and resolution, however, did not materially change 
anything. That the Russians might be addressing Cuba in other ways does not 
seem to have occurred to the British delegation. Instead, it was noted on 18 
October that the Soviets had made little headway in the General Assembly in 
what, so far, was seen as a successful session.33 
That the Russians were up to something was nevertheless widely suspected. 
They had assiduously propagated rumours since the summer that Khrushchev 
intended to repeat his performance in 1960 and attend the General Assembly, 
probably in November once the American mid-term elections were out of the 
way. His previous attendance had culminated in a dramatic demarché. Not only 
had Khrushchev banged his shoe on the table to interrupt a Philippines delegate, 
but he had also used the occasion to launch major campaigns on decolonisation, 
disarmament and the mechanisms of the UN.34  
The first had appealed to the Afro-Asians and prompted the Fourth Committee, 
which spent much time causing imperial embarrassment to the British. This was 
seen as somewhat hypocritical by the British: in the midst of the Cuban crisis a 
violent attack on British policy in Southern Rhodesia by a Soviet delegate from 
Estonia was rebuffed by reference ‘to an example of colonialism which had 
occurred some 22 years ago in an area well-known to the USSR delegate.’35  
The second tied in with the search for a nuclear test ban being considered by the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. As Godber pointed out in 
the First Committee (dealing with disarmament) as the Cuban crisis reached its 
height, this initiative was also problematic. The Russians had introduced a 
moratorium on tests from 1958-61, during which time there were over a 
hundred unidentified seismic events in the Soviet Union: the British 
nevertheless wanted to believe the Russians were acting in good faith ‘but 
events in Cuba remind us all of the need for stark realism’.36 Americans, 
especially in Congress, were far more sceptical still. This mistrust, and 
consequent insistence on the need to be able to verify the other side’s activities 
throughout 1962 continued to stymie progress on the Test Ban Macmillan so 
urgently sought.37 It, and the increasing tempo of testing, with some 135 tests 
having been carried out by both sides since the Russians ended their moratorium 
in autumn 1961, also created the atmosphere of nuclear anxiety which formed 
the backdrop to the Cuban crisis.38 
The third was about the Troika proposal. It was assumed that if Khrushchev was 
coming again he would want similarly dramatic suggestions to put forward. The 
best guess the British could come up with, however, was either a renewal of 
calls for a World Trade Conference the Soviet leader had first raised in May, or 
some new proposals on the ongoing East/West confrontation in Berlin.39 Their 
US counterparts had similar views. It was only once the crisis broke that the 
idea that Cuba was likely to be central to Khrushchev’s theme was grasped.40 
A paper by the Foreign Office’s Northern Department in February had offered 
suggestive insights into Soviet thinking, observing that the main field of conflict 
with Communism was now in the Third World, wherein the Soviets would try 
to sap the frontiers of the West. That the Soviets might also seek to shore up 
their outpost of Cuba with nuclear missiles did not, however, occur to its 
authors.41  
The ceaseless Soviet bloc repetition at the UN that Cuba required protection 
against American aggression was seemingly designed to provide rhetorical 
covering fire for this deployment. So were the protestations of purely defensive 
intentions in Cuba – and a likely nuclear response to attempts at interdiction – 
presented in Tass on 11 September 1962.42 This statement persuaded the 
American embassy in Moscow that Khrushchev still intended to attend the 
General Assembly, and Kennedy’s close advisers remained convinced of this as 
late as 16 October.43 In this first act of the Cuban crisis, before the Americans 
were even fully aware of its nature, the UN was thus being used by the Russians 
as a stage on which to set out their case. It is impossible to know precisely how 
Khrushchev might have used this situation if, with the missiles by then in place, 
he had indeed appeared in New York in November. Khrushchev was seen as an 
inveterate improviser by Western observers, such as the British ambassador to 
Moscow, Sir Frank Roberts.44 His earlier comments to Mikoyan about publicly 
revealing them in a way which redressed the nuclear balance in favour of the 
Soviets, prevented an invasion of Cuba and put the Americans ‘in their place’, 
however, suggests how he sought to use the trailed UN appearance.45 He might 
also have picked up on the two themes of Gromyko’s 22 September speech, 
which was presumably intended to set the scene for Khrushchev’s arrival. In 
this the Soviet Foreign Minister had not only insisted on the defence and self-
determination of Cuba, but also ‘dealt at length with the question of a 
preventative nuclear war’. The folly of such an idea – seen as favoured by many 
senior American figures who wished to exploit their nuclear superiority – was 
also highlighted in Khrushchev’s later speech to the Supreme Soviet. Either by 
the deployment or the subsequent withdrawal of the missiles, he undermined the 
force of such arguments, which were both inimical to Cuban security and to the 
peaceful co-existence that Khrushchev proclaimed as one of Lenin’s great 
legacies.46  
By the time Gromyko spoke, the Americans were well-aware of the Russian 
military build-up in Cuba. Overflight photography on 29 August confirmed 
eight surface-to-air missile [SAM] sites on the island. On 29 September, in 
response to Republican pressure in Congress, Kennedy publicly emphasised that 
if Cuba became ‘an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet 
Union then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own 
security and that of its allies’.47 The following month it became clear that Cuba 
had become such a base, and the secret conclave of Kennedy’s Executive 
Committee [ExComm] was established on 16 October to work out the US 
response. 
By 18 October, when Gromyko reiterated defensive intentions in Cuba in his 
meeting with Kennedy, it was clear that the options consisted of diplomatic 
action, military action or interdiction through some kind of blockade. As 
Kennedy recognised, each posed diplomatic issues with allies as well as with 
Khrushchev. He pointed out that ‘an awful lot of conditioning would have to go 
in’ before America’s allies would ‘support our action against Cuba, because 
they think that we’re slightly demented on this subject.’48 Curiously, the 
obvious role of the UN as an arena for this conditioning does not seem to have 
occurred then to ExComm, which instead at this stage saw it largely as a 
potential back-channel for an approach to Castro.49 Limited attention was given 
to how to sell any action before world opinion. By 20 October consideration of 
such issues was largely confined to the – as it turned out, well-founded – 
assumption that OAS support would be readily obtained for a blockade, thereby 
demonstrating compliance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.50  
Rusk then suggested that the UN might have a more direct role in the crisis. On 
22 October he raised with the President that UN observation teams could be 
used to freeze the nuclear missile capability in Cuba, Italy and Turkey. At the 
time, Kennedy made little of this. He was fixated on removing the Soviet 
missiles from Cuba, and had already privately indicated his willingness in a 
National Security Council meeting on 20 October to also remove the American 
missiles from Italy and Turkey, replacing them with more effective Polaris 
submarines.51 Instead, the UN’s prime function for the next stage in the crisis in 
the President’s eyes was therefore as the arena in which the appeal for removal 
of the Soviet missiles would be made.  
On 20 October Kennedy decided that the first step towards that aim was through 
a limited quarantine on military shipments into Cuba, announced two days later. 
Macmillan’s initial reaction was dubious. Writing to Ormsby-Gore for guidance 
on the President’s intentions, he felt sure that it would take too long and lead 
nowhere. Nevertheless, ‘Since it seemed impossible to stop his action I did not 
make the effort, although in the course of the day I was in mind to do so.’ This 
was because the obvious alternatives were an American coup de main or an 
international conference. Both were fraught with danger, the latter being 
potentially open-ended and putting Berlin into play. However, the Prime 
Minister noted ‘I could not allow a situation in Europe or in the world to 
develop which looks like escalating into war without trying some action by 
calling a conference on my own’.52 This, however, was only as a final resort. 
Earlier that afternoon in Washington, Kennedy met with his old friend, Ormsby-
Gore. When asked about options the British ambassador reinforced Kennedy’s 
view that the quarantine would both be easier to sell to world opinion and less 
likely to have repercussions in Berlin than the alternative of air strikes.53 As 
Kennedy explained to Macmillan that evening in their first telephone 
conversation of the crisis, he did not want more precipitate action because ‘it 
invites [Khrushchev] so directly into Berlin.’54 Home was present at each of 
these calls and he made sure that British legations were instructed to deny any 
linkage between the crisis and Berlin.55 
Meanwhile, at 4.30pm on Sunday 21 October, Stevenson was summoned to 
brief the Acting Secretary-General. At 10.00pm he urgently requested the 
chairman of the UN Security Council – which under its monthly rotation at that 
moment was the combative Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin – to convene a 
meeting at which he tabled an emergency resolution on Cuba. This resolution 
called for the dismantling and removal of the Soviet missiles under article 40 of 
the UN Charter, to be supervised by a UN observer corps, the removal of the 
quarantine as soon as this process was completed, and for the convening of 
American/Soviet talks to remove threats to the security of the Western 
Hemisphere and world peace.56 
The Foreign Office perceived various problems with this draft: apart from the 
unhelpful imprecision of the term ‘quarantine’, it failed to mention the 
continued importation of offensive weapons or to seek UN authority for the US 
action to interdict those imports. Because of the dubious legality of the 
American operations, Home noted to Dean, UN authority would be particularly 
useful. He concluded: ‘I realise that the Americans may reject all these points. 
Nevertheless, although I attach importance to them, you may in that event still 
vote for the draft resolution.’57 
The Cubans and Russians, meanwhile, responded to the quarantine by letters 
denouncing US aggression and themselves demanding an emergency meeting of 
the Security Council. The Soviets in particular argued a breach of the UN 
Charter right of all countries to organise their lives in their own ways and 
protect their own security. The Americans were portrayed as hypocritically 
objecting to Cuban defence, whilst they had themselves hitherto refused Soviet 
proposals that all foreign military bases around the world should be 
dismantled.58 
At a State Department briefing for the ambassadorial group of Britain, France 
and West Germany on 22 October it was pointed out that this was a false 
analogy. The deployments complained of had been in response to the nearby 
menace of Soviet missiles, at the request of the host governments at the NATO 
Council in December 1957 and before the Americans could provide long-range 
protection through Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.59 Stevenson went on to 
point out at the first meeting of the Security Council on the crisis the following 
evening that the US deployment had not been clandestine, as in Cuba. In 
response Dr Mario Garcia Inchaustegui, the Cuban representative, told the 
Security Council that the Americans had presented it with a fait accompli by 
imposing the quarantine without first seeking UN sanction. His call for the 
immediate withdrawal of US forces was followed by Zorin, who presented his 
own draft resolution calling for an end to the quarantine and American 
interference in Cuba, and for talks between the Soviet Union, America and 
Cuba to remove the threat of war.60  
Earlier that day Stevenson and Zorin had staged the annual US/USSR clash in 
the General Assembly over which China should be admitted to the UN. Even 
though the Indian delegate argued three days later that the People’s Republic 
needed to be admitted to the UN in order to check the aggression his country 
was then suffering, the Americans once again secured the retention of the 
Chinese seat for the Nationalists at the 17th Assembly.61 Standard and somewhat 
ritualised East/West clashes on other issues thus continued within the forum of 
the UN.  
The UN had by then become the obvious public arena for a war of words 
between East and West over Cuba. In ExComm there was a mood that the 
Americans had seized the initiative.62 Dean, in contrast, felt that the Soviets 
were skilfully using the UN to their advantage. He noted that Zorin’s statement 
cleverly emphasized the right of every country to defend itself, and the failure 
of the US to seek prior approval for its actions from the Security Council.63 At 
the time, however, the quarantine was not yet in place. Having awaited OAS 
support, Kennedy only signed the executive order at 7.00pm Washington time 
on 23 October as the Security Council were meeting. The quarantine came into 
force at 2.00pm Greenwich mean time the following day.64 
Meanwhile, the Algerian and United Arab Republic [UAR] delegations at the 
UN called a meeting on the evening of 23 October of some 40 or so non-aligned 
countries to draft an alternative to the US resolution. Dean anticipated that this 
would urge an end to the quarantine and the convening of talks by the Acting 
Secretary-General, leaving the missiles in place. The US, he therefore noted, 
needed to build their case by releasing the photographic evidence of the missile 
sites.65 There was a risk of neutral delegations at the UN proving as sceptical as 
the British press. The doubts and hostility even of right-wing newspapers like 
the Daily Telegraph appalled the US ambassador, David Bruce.66 With Bruce’s 
support and the subsequently-rescinded authority of the Pentagon, the American 
intelligence officer Chester Cooper – at the prompting of Macmillan’s private 
secretary, Philip de Zulueta – released sanitised versions of the pictures that 
evening in London. They appeared on British television in time for the 
Newsweek representative to embarrass US Defense Secretary, Robert 
McNamara, at a press conference over his refusal to release this material to the 
American media.67 
The Security Council was due to meet again at 9.00am on 24 October, with 
Dean down to speak. In response to a request for Foreign Office guidance he 
had been advised to stick to a short intervention, stressing the provocation of the 
Soviet moves.68 This he duly did. Whilst reminding the Security Council that 
‘We have never denied the right of the Cuban people to choose their own 
political regime or of the Cuban government to take such defensive measures as 
they think necessary’ he therefore stressed that ‘by no stretch of the imagination 
can a nuclear missile with a range of over 2,000 miles in Cuba be called 
defensive’.69 
It is not clear if by then Dean had received Home’s request ‘to have the earliest 
possible indication of whether U Thant is likely to take any initiative and, if he 
is, what it will be.’70 The non-aligned countries, led by the UAR, Ghana, 
Indonesia and Cyprus, were certainly urging an initially non-committal Acting 
Secretary-General to take the initiative.71 A Ghana/UAR resolution was 
prepared, to be tabled when the Security Council re-convened at 6.00pm, urging 
U Thant to confer directly with ‘the parties directly concerned’ to address the 
crisis.72 Both the US and the Soviets tried to discourage this development. 
Dean, however, felt that the US had not done enough to win over the largely 
critical Afro-Asians at the UN. This mattered as long as the authority of a UN 
resolution was seen as desirable. To pass such a resolution in the Security 
Council required seven votes. As Dean noted, all three resolutions would fail: 
the Soviet and Ghana/UAR ones because of insufficient votes and the US one 
because it would be vetoed by the Soviets. The only alternative then available 
was the Uniting for Peace mechanism of Resolution 377 established in 
November 1950 during the Korean War, which involved instead securing a 
General Assembly majority. The Americans had already indicated their 
intention to use this procedure.73 This had been relatively easy for the West in 
the early 1950s, but with the greatly increased UN membership of 1962 it was 
more of a challenge. Macmillan made clear his doubts this would work in his 
first message to Kennedy of the crisis.74 Dean meanwhile commented: 
The Americans have done a certain amount by way of briefing friendly 
and non-aligned delegations about the missile sites but they still have a 
long way to go if they are to convince a good majority to vote in their 
favour in the event that the debate is carried from the Security Council 
into the General Assembly.75 
Such concerns were rendered nugatory by U Thant’s intervention when the 
Security Council re-convened that evening. Ironically, it was United Nations 
day. Once the Ghanaian representative had tabled their resolution U Thant 
announced that he had, during the customary UN day concert, despatched to 
Kennedy and Khrushchev messages urging a standstill on both shipments and 
the quarantine for two to three weeks to allow negotiations.76 After much 
American pressure, he also added an appeal to Dorticós to cease construction 
work on the sites.77  
The Security Council met again the following day. This proved to be the most 
dramatic visual moment of the crisis, as Stevenson challenged Zorin to 
acknowledge that missiles had been deployed in Cuba before, as Dean had 
suggested, theatrically providing the photographic proof. This focused the crisis 
on the existence and potency of those missiles. Accordingly, the debate on the 
various draft resolutions had been overtaken by U Thant’s initiative and 
Stevenson’s revelations. One phase of the UN’s involvement with the crisis had 
ended. The various committees of the General Assembly quietly continued their 
work with minimal reference to Cuba. The Polish delegate told the First 
Committee that there was no reason why American aggression should deflect 
their ongoing search for agreement on a nuclear test ban.78 Cuba ceased to be 
actively discussed at the UN and the focus of UN activity in the crisis shifted 
from the Security Council to the Secretariat.  
Macmillan’s initial reaction to U Thant’s initiative was hostile. It was, he told 
Kennedy in their telephone conversation on 24 October, a ‘very dangerous 
message.’79 The grounds for this observation have usually been overlooked.80 
This was because, as the Prime Minister noted in his diary, ‘Now that [the] 
Russians have been proved blatant liars, no unpoliced agreement with them is 
possible.’81 This oversight in U Thant’s communications was also unsatisfactory 
to the Americans.82 Very publicly, he had focused world opinion on the standoff 
rather than their problem of how to (verifiably) remove the missiles.  
By this stage Macmillan had realised the drawbacks posed by an international 
conference. Home, however, raised the idea of a conference with Ormsby-Gore 
on 24 October. Anticipating American reactions, the ambassador declined to 
raise the idea.83 It is important, however, to be clear on the role Home saw such 
a conference playing. Whilst potentially useful in resolving the crisis, Home’s 
emphasis was on it paving the way to tackling other important matters, such as 
disarmament.84 However, that it might also be used as a Soviet propaganda tool 
was apparent, particularly when the Polish ambassador invited himself to see 
the Foreign Secretary earlier that day. Dr Rodzinski deliberately raised the 
notion that ‘a conference would be the most practical way for both sides to get 
out of the present dangerous situation’. Home rebuffed this obvious invitation, 
instead merely observing that if a conference was desired it was for one of the 
two protagonists to propose it. Interestingly, he also emphasized to Rodzinski 
‘the situation would be immediately eased if Dr Castro would accept a United 
Nations mission to inspect the nature of the Soviet missiles being installed in 
Cuba.’85  
A similar line emerged in the Prime Minister’s parliamentary statement at 
11.00am on 25 October. The Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, pushed 
for Macmillan to intervene directly – an approach Rodzinski seemed keen to 
encourage. Instead, Macmillan stressed that it was best ‘to use the United 
Nations as an instrument.’86 Earlier that morning he spelt out to Kennedy what 
he meant, suggesting immobilisation of the sites under UN inspection, obviating 
the need for military action.87 
There was, of course, another earlier danger point: Rodzinski had ended his 
interview with Home by raising alarm about what would happen when the 
Americans started stopping the Russian ships. That morning in Washington 
McNamara expected the first intercepts to occur at noon the following day.88 
Following back-channel suggestions from Kennedy, after the Security Council 
meeting of 25 October, U Thant therefore sent a further message to each leader 
urging them to avoid confrontation around the quarantine line.89  
By the time of Macmillan’s Cabinet meeting at 2.45pm on 25 October, whilst 
some ships known to be carrying interdicted material were still on-course or 
halting, others were diverting from the area.90 The Prime Minister was also 
aware that work on the three Intermediate Range [IRBM] and six Medium 
Range [MRBM] missile sites continued apace and that all the latter would likely 
be operational within two days.91 Observations from the British embassy in 
Havana confirmed this evidence garnered from the continuing US surveillance 
flights over Cuba.92 This material, passed to Washington, provided additional 
intelligence about the situation on the island, though the fact that neither the 
embassy nor the British in general were informed by the Americans of the 
locations of the sites until 27 October somewhat hampered their utility.93 
There meanwhile remained, as Home pointed out at the same Cabinet, the 
problem of the UAR/Ghanaian resolution. Earlier that day he had tried to 
explain to the UAR ambassador the flaws in trying to tackle the crisis through a 
resolution which required the removal of the quarantine but left the missiles in 
place. The Egyptian took the view that difficult as it was for Kennedy to accept 
Soviet missiles in Cuba, it was much more difficult for Khrushchev to accept 
their removal. This misconceived view of both the crisis and the role of the UN 
in tackling it had to be modified if the issue was really to be addressed. As 
Home told his colleagues, for Kennedy to be able to end the quarantine and 
resolve the crisis, under the scrutiny of the UN the remaining in-bound Russian 
cargos had to be inspected and the missiles already in place dismantled.94 
Not all were by then so clear on how to use the UN. Ormsby-Gore noted of his 
conversation with the State Department’s Harlan Cleveland earlier on 25 
October that the Americans saw the private talks U Thant was initiating in two 
parts: starting with a standstill agreement followed by verification, possibly 
under UN supervision.95 The following day U Thant telephoned Rusk and 
obtained American assurance that if he could get Soviet and Cuban agreement 
to an UN verified standstill then the US would hold off invasion.96 Castro, 
however, had already broadcast his objections to the idea of UN inspection, 
prompting the British ambassador in Havana, H. S. Marchant, to wonder if 
‘neutral diplomats already here’ might be an acceptable alternative.97 J. M. 
Brown of the Foreign Office’s United Nations Department had his doubts. If, 
for instance, neutrals were to be used ‘The Egyptian in particular is sharply anti-
American and the Ghanaian chargé d’Affaires would not know a missile if he 
saw one.’98 
The issue of what to do about the missiles already on Cuba was meanwhile 
becoming acute. This was because, although the British, French and West 
German ambassadors were briefed in Washington on 25 October that suspect 
Russian ships were heading home, the continuing work on the sites meant that a 
decision on whether or not to bomb them would, Rusk indicated, have to be 
taken in the next two to three days. As Kennedy told Ormsby-Gore by telephone 
the following morning, this meant that they could not give U Thant long to 
conclude his negotiations. 
At the ambassadors’ meeting the French representative, Hervé Alphand, 
disclosed that the Russians in Europe had been asking questions about trading 
missiles in Cuba for those in Italy or Turkey.99 This seems, however, to have 
happened through discreet and deniable approaches via French or Italian 
diplomats. Interestingly, the Foreign Office’s Northern Department does not 
seem to have realised that this might reflect a Soviet search for an exit strategy, 
instead dismissing these developments as attempts to find chinks between the 
Americans and their allies.100 
The British were disinclined to entertain missile swop suggestions, unless it 
concerned the Thor missiles deployed in 1958 which they had already decided 
to remove during 1963.101 Nor were they inclined to link inspection regimes. 
Macmillan’s message to Kennedy on the morning of 25 October referred only to 
UN inspection in Cuba. The same message was firmly conveyed when Home 
asked V. A. Loginov, the Soviet chargé d’Affaires, to call on him that 
morning.102 These moves predated the proposals prompted by Rusk put in New 
York later that day by Andrew Cordier, which envisaged an inspection regime 
in Turkey as well as Cuba. Cordier had been in Hammarskjöld’s inner circle 
when Assistant Under-Secretary at the UN and was now a Columbia University 
professor. For Dean, however, these proposals raised the problem of ‘how many 
United States bases should be brought under the surveillance of the United 
Nations Commission.’103 
In contrast, Dean was pushing U Thant to raise inspection and verification 
specific to Cuba with the Russians when he saw them at 1.00pm on 26 
October.104 These talks initially made little progress as Zorin had not received 
instructions. In ExComm, meanwhile, Rusk presciently expressed doubts that 
the other side would welcome UN inspectors. Nor was inspection sufficient: 
McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser, warned that any negotiations 
at the UN ‘which presumes that [the missiles] might stay there, we’ve had it.’ 
The kind of standstill U Thant had initially envisaged of two-three weeks for 
negotiation was therefore no longer acceptable and it was stressed to Stevenson 
that instead the missiles had to be rendered inoperable.105 That afternoon 
Stevenson returned to New York and emphasized to U Thant that shipping and 
work on the sites had to cease and the missiles made harmless before the 
quarantine would be lifted. Afterwards he told Dean that U Thant, however, was 
pessimistic about the chances of Castro allowing access for the necessary 
verification.106 
This line contrasted with what U Thant had told Zorin earlier. The Acting 
Secretary-General had intervened prompted by non-aligned concerns about the 
quarantine, and on that he remained focused. With Zorin he therefore 
concentrated not on the missiles already on the island but those en route, 
looking to get the Soviets to suspend interdicted shipping in return for 
suspension of the quarantine. Earlier that day the International Committee of the 
Red Cross [ICRC] had offered its services, prompting U Thant to suggest to 
Zorin that they might assist with policing the shipping if the quarantine was 
lifted.107 
Macmillan was more focused on the missiles on Cuba when he talked again 
with the President late on 26 October. At the time neither seems to have been 
fully aware of Khrushchev’s proposal to dismantle the offensive weapons in 
Cuba, firstly in return for a guarantee that Cuba would not be invaded, tightened 
in a second message (on 27 October) by linkage with the quid pro quo of 
American withdrawal of their ballistic missiles in Turkey. Kennedy’s hints at 
such developments led the Prime Minister to enthuse about Cuban inviolability. 
This had been raised by the Acting Secretary-General himself earlier that 
afternoon with Stevenson. It was also raised with the Americans via the KGB 
operative Alexander Fomin in Washington that afternoon.108 It was, however, 
Macmillan who put forward the idea of U Thant himself leading an inspection 
team to Cuba to address the problem of verification.109 Home wrote to Ormsby-
Gore that same evening with similar suggestions, also raising the idea of static 
observation posts to guard against surprises like Cuba in future.110 
British anxiety to secure reliable verification that the missiles had been rendered 
inoperable increased on 27 October, even before receipt just after 8.00pm of 
Kennedy’s message to Macmillan stressing that ‘we must secure the actual 
dismantling of the missiles currently in Cuba as the first order of business.’111 
The President at least reassured Macmillan that he would not take ‘drastic 
action’ without first informing the Prime Minister.112 This did not comfort the 
British. They would have been even more concerned had they known that, 
contrary to Soviet assurances to U Thant, some Soviet ships were still heading 
for the quarantine line. This situation prompted ExComm to agree, about 
10.00am on 27 October, to send an urgent message to the Acting Secretary-
General to make sure that the Soviets knew where the line was drawn.113 
At the same time on the other side of the Atlantic, on the advice of the Foreign 
Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Harold Caccia, Home at 3.00pm on 27 
October despatched to Dean instructions to put in U Thant’s head the idea  
[P]referably with but if necessary without any special authorisation from 
the United Nations, that he is going at once to Cuba with a team of 
inspectors in order to arrange that....the missile sites would be rendered 
inoperable, the work stopped and the import of offensive weapons into 
Cuba from any source prevented. 
Dean was also told to make use of two ideas that they knew, from Ormsby-
Gore’s report of a Rusk briefing for the ambassadorial group, were acceptable 
to the Americans. One of these was the inviolability of Cuba, which would 
immediately grant the Cubans the security they claimed they needed without the 
missiles. An implicit theme in British diplomacy throughout the crisis, this now 
became more and more an explicit goal. The other was the Brazilian proposal in 
the UN’s First Committee for a Latin American nuclear-free zone.114 As 
Llewellyn Thompson later pointed out to the ambassadorial group, once the 
immediate crisis was over, ‘it might be difficult for the United States to 
continue to violate Cuban airspace and a scheme of de-nuclearisation might 
provide continued adequate inspection.’115 
Three hours later Dean saw U Thant. The Acting Secretary-General had already 
the previous day under American pressure renewed his appeal for an end to 
work on the sites during negotiations, this time directly to Castro. Based on the 
messages which had just passed between the principals, notably Khrushchev’s 
response to Kennedy’s guarantee of Cuba from invasion in return for the 
removal of offensive weapons, he felt positive about Castro’s likely reaction. 
Dean was not so sanguine. Aware that there were at the UN ‘some allegedly 
neutral delegations who are seeking compromise at almost any price’ he felt it 
was important for U Thant to press on with his negotiations. 
Dean noted that the Acting Secretary-General shared his view that Turkey 
would complicate matters. The issue was to concentrate on Cuba. Going himself 
to Cuba to try to break the log-jam, in the manner of Hammarskjöld’s trips to 
the Congo, does not seem to have occurred to U Thant until put to him by Dean. 
It was, however, an idea he obviously responded to. Later that afternoon he saw 
Raúl Roa Garcia, the Cuban foreign minister.116 These discussions seem to have 
prompted Castro to invite U Thant to Cuba as long as, during negotiations, the 
US desisted from aggression including the quarantine.117 
Ormsby-Gore received a generally positive response from Kennedy when he put 
the idea of U Thant going to Cuba to the President that morning.118 Before the 
Prime Minister received this news, at around the time ExComm convened at 
4.00pm on 27 October, Macmillan followed up the messages to Dean by 
transmitting to Ormsby-Gore his response to Kennedy’s alarming message of 
the previous evening. This suggested a standstill for negotiations whilst the 
Soviets agreed to halt imports of ballistic missiles and work on the sites and to 
make the weapons inoperable. Macmillan suggested in turn that the US should 
agree to lift the quarantine and not take any action against Cuba during the 
standstill, all under UN supervision.119  
It is not clear when the ambassador received this or whether he discussed it with 
Rusk before the Secretary of State presented a draft response to U Thant about 
the Soviet proposals at ExComm. Stevenson had assured U Thant that morning 
of a reasonable response from the US. Early in the ExComm discussions 
Kennedy suggested that they should simply seek from the Acting Secretary-
General ‘assurances from the Soviet Union that work has ceased.’120 This line 
and the resulting note verbale telephoned through to Stevenson that afternoon 
were both very similar in approach to that counselled by the Prime Minister. In 
this response to Khrushchev’s letters of 26 and 27 October the President, 
avoiding the Turkey issue, indicated that the quarantine would be lifted and 
Cuba assured against invasion once Soviet weapons were removed and shipping 
halted under adequate UN safeguards.121  
Well aware by then of the American military build-up – as were U Thant and 
the British – Khrushchev later argued that this message gave him the assurances 
he had sought in his previous letters to Kennedy. He did not reveal to the 
Supreme Soviet that he had also been reassured by a clandestine offer to remove 
the American missiles from Turkey. The idea of thisis trade had been 
sympathetically discussed trongly endorsed by the BBC and much of the British 
Sunday press, though not the British government. It That it actually happened 
was, however, deliberately concealed from America’s allies.122 
At 1.15pm (London time) on 28 October the message came through that 
Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive weapons. Home 
and Rusk sent each other congratulatory messages tinged with relief. Ormsby-
Gore found the latter and his colleagues had been ‘so preoccupied with the 
immediate problems that had been facing them that they had as yet no clear 
idea’ as to the next moves. Whilst the ambassador replied by looking ahead to 
addressing the broad range of disarmament issues Home had instanced during 
the crisis, for U Thant, however, the immediate problems were by no means 
over.123 
As well as making the US/Soviet agreement work there was the issue that 
Castro wanted additional guarantees. His five point speech, repeated in a letter 
to U Thant, emphasized the need as well for the cessation of the following 
hostile American actions against Cuba: 
1) Economic blockade and commercial pressures; 
2) Subversive activities; 
3) ‘Piratical attacks’ from the US and Puerto Rico; 
4) Violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters; 
5) Retention of the Guantanamo base.124 
U Thant found Castro very bitter that he had not been informed by Khrushchev 
of the dismantling decision. Having been assured of Soviet support since 
Mikoyan’s 1960 visit, he felt betrayed.125 Dean noted that the Cuban ‘would 
have to be allowed to cool down before he will agree to United Nations 
inspection.’126 His five points also raised problems: Dean worried that the non-
aligned and the Indian Deputy Secretary-General, C. V. Narasimhan, were 
broadly sympathetic to their aims.127 The Americans were particularly keen to 
avoid discussion on point five: indeed, the UAR representatives passed on to the 
British before U Thant’s departure that they were pressing Castro not to raise 
Guantanamo feeling he had achieved much already with the agreement not to 
invade.128 They were clearly unsuccessful and U Thant told the Indian chargé 
d’Affaires in Havana that he found the Cubans very difficult during his talks 
there of 30-31 October.129  
Before his departure for Havana he obtained Soviet and American agreement to 
ICRC policing of cargos.130 The missiles in Cuba, however, remained a 
problem, with neither the British embassy nor American overflights detecting 
evidence of dismantling.131 V. V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet’s First Deputy Foreign 
Minister, who had flown to New York to manage the talks at the UN, told U 
Thant that the Soviets would only agree to verification of removal. For obvious 
reasons they would not let UN observers view the missiles, though U Thant was 
invited (and declined) to view one whilst in Cuba.132 Kuznetsov also pressed for 
immediate suspension of the quarantine at a Security Council lunch hosted by 
Zorin on 30 October.133 Meanwhile, in Cuba, the Acting Secretary-General 
made better progress with the commanding Soviet general, Issa Pliev. He, 
unlike Castro, had been kept informed of thinking in Moscow. Pliev told U 
Thant he received the order to dismantle at noon on 28 October and started 
work at 5.00pm that day.134 By then the MRBM sites were already operational. 
U Thant obtained a promise of dismantling the IRBM and MRBM sites by 2 
November before returning to New York on 31 October.135 
American overflights confirmed dismantling had indeed substantially taken 
place by that date. They also observed, however, that work continued on the Il-
28s and the SAM sites. The latter were deemed defensive, but the bombers, 
though essentially obsolete, in American eyes had to go.136 Progress on 
verification, however, was complicated by Castro’s intransigence. This 
prompted the Americans on 2 November 1962 to request the British to break off 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, a request swiftly turned down. As a later 
Foreign Office memorandum pointed out, the Soviet despatch of Mikoyan to 
Cuba suggested that Castro would come round. Castro certainly needed the 
massive aid received from Russia, aid which would render any economic 
sanctions pointless. Whilst Castro’s downfall was still seen as desirable, for the 
time-being leverage on him was, in the British view, best left to the Soviets.137 
Mikoyan’s support for the five points, stressed at his press conference in New 
York on 2 November, somewhat thawed relations with Castro. That same 
evening, he dined with the US delegation and repeatedly demanded (and was as 
repeatedly rebuffed) implementation of the five points, as well as an end to the 
quarantine. This the Americans would not concede until the ICRC inspection 
regime came into force.138 It was not until 6 November that Paul Rüegger of the 
ICRC met U Thant in New York and was able to agree how the regime would 
operate.139 
Two days earlier, Narasimhan told Dean that Mikoyan staying in Cuba despite 
the recent death of his wife seemed grounds for optimism.140 Mikoyan was 
trying to find ways to circumvent Castro’s objections. He seized upon the 
suggestion by John McCloy, who had been appointed by Kennedy to lead the 
US side of the negotiations at the UN, that US warships could come close to 
Soviet vessels to see the missiles being transported home. This process began 
on 7 November. Such arrangements obviated the need for ICRC inspection.141 
There nevertheless remained difficulties with the Cubans over the Il-28s, 
prompting Kennedy for the second time in the crisis to contemplate embargoing 
oil bound for the island. Some 140,000 US troops also remained marshalled for 
action.142 After pressure from Khrushchev, however, on 19 November Castro 
wrote to U Thant accepting the decision by the Soviets to withdraw them. This 
marked the final end of the crisis for the Americans, who stepped down security 
levels and formally ended the quarantine.143 
It was not, however, the end for the Russians. It was only on 22 November that 
Mikoyan also persuaded a reluctant and suspicious Castro that the Luna tactical 
nuclear missiles, which had not been detected by the Americans and therefore 
hitherto excluded from the deal, could not be given to the Cubans on the 
grounds that there would not be a Soviet base there to manage them.144 
Arguably it was not until Castro’s lengthy visit to the USSR of April-June 1963 
that fences were fully mended between the Soviets and their new protégé in the 
Western Hemisphere.145 
Mikoyan’s deal was as unknown to U Thant as it was to the Americans. The 
removal of the Il-28s, however, was also not the end of the crisis for him. Like 
Mikoyan, the Acting Secretary-General was concerned about the emotional 
state of the Cuban leader. In the First Committee on 16 November the Cuban 
delegate repeated the threat that US warplanes in Cuban airspace would be shot 
at.146 The risk that Castro would launch a nuclear Armageddon was something 
that Mikoyan took it upon himself to avoid through his tense and eventually 
successful four hour meeting with Castro on 22 November. Castro, however, 
had not dropped his five points. Although U Thant had told him in Cuba that 
there was no prospect of the five points being adopted by the Security Council 
the Acting Secretary-General privately sympathised. On 12 November he 
suggested to Stevenson an inspection regime for the Cuban exile camps to 
assuage the Cuban premier.147 This move, and its rebuff, was unknown to 
Castro, who on 26 November wrote to U Thant reiterating his demand for the 
five points and complaining that the US had reneged on the agreement not to 
invade on the pretext that Cuba had not allowed international inspection. This 
became a continuing refrain.148  
Meanwhile, there remained the unresolved issue of the Security Council 
resolutions. U Thant had returned from Cuba determined to avoid early 
meetings at which these might again emerge. He was also avoiding meetings at 
which disagreement over his position might be raised. Mahmoud Riad, the UAR 
delegate who was that month’s Security Council chairman, tried repeatedly to 
get the Russians to agree to elect U Thant. Such agreement was complicated by 
the animosity between Zorin and the Acting Secretary-General throughout the 
crisis, exacerbated by the Russian’s attempts to bully U Thant into the anti-
American line he expected from Afro-Asian delegates.149 Dean informed Home 
on 27 November that ‘I do not expect that the Russians will move until they 
have had at least one more meeting with the Americans about Cuba.’150 
Although, three days later, agreement to elect U Thant was secured, the 
resolutions were not finally dealt with until Kuznetsov and Stevenson wrote 
jointly to U Thant on 7 January 1963 assuring him that, although not all issues 
between their governments in the Caribbean region were concluded, there was 
no need further to occupy the Security Council on such matters. Inchaustegui’s 
letter of the same date, unsurprisingly, disagreed and continued to raise the five 
points. In his response two days later all U Thant could do was seek to reassure 
the Cubans, who nevertheless continued to complain of American-sponsored 
incursions on their territory and airspace to the Secretary-General.151 
In his end of session report Dean was full of praise for U Thant’s effective 
intervention in the crisis. Furthermore, he felt that the crisis, far from building to 
a crescendo at the UN – as seems to have been Khrushchev’s original intent – 
instead ensured that the Russians were relatively ineffective during the 17th 
Assembly. Dean did not reflect on his own role in the crisis, merely 
complaining subsequently that Stevenson seemed to receive more information 
in a more timely fashion from Washington than he himself did from London.152 
For him, Cuba was an interlude in a session crowded with other matters.  
During that session the UN was a site for issuing and amplifying Soviet 
propaganda. The General Assembly was heavily used to build-up a picture of 
American threats to Cuba preparatory to Khrushchev’s aborted trip to New 
York. The purpose of this rhetorical offensive does not seem to have been 
suspected by Western delegates or U Thant. However, once the discovery of the 
missiles was revealed on 22 October, the UN’s role changed. It became the 
arena in which the two sides accused each other. In the process, it helped to 
contain the crisis. Neither the quarantine nor Security Council resolutions, 
however, would actually resolve the crisis.  
The UN dimension of the crisis moved to a third stage with U Thant’s letters of 
24 October, which effectively ended debate in the Security Council. These 
letters responded to non-aligned pressure and called merely for a standstill. The 
need to amend this unfortunate effect and prevent a non-aligned coalescence 
behind such unsatisfactory solutions was thereafter a constant of British 
attitudes towards the crisis. Dean’s subsequent concerns about the deleterious 
effect of Khrushchev’s demand for the removal of American missiles from 
Turkey reflected this anxiety about non-aligned attitudes, hence his 
encouragement of U Thant to focus instead exclusively on Cuba. 
After all, the British were well-aware from their experiences in the Fourth 
Committee that Russian propaganda was directed at the non-aligned. Not least, 
there was sedulous promotion of the Soviets’ peaceful intentions. During the 
crisis this was, British diplomats felt, deliberately played up with both neutral 
and Western (but not American) legations around the world.153 This was not 
without success. As R. Heath Mason of the Foreign Office’s Northern 
Department subsequently noted ‘there is no doubt that his peace-maker theme is 
very acceptable to the non-aligned world’, and it was often Khrushchev rather 
than Kennedy who was regarded in neutral countries in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis as a statesmanlike man of peace.154 Non-aligned voting with the 
USSR indeed increased during the 17th Assembly.155  
It was through such propaganda successes, rather than military action, that the 
Soviets sought to win the cold war.156 In that sense Khrushchev largely 
achieved his goals in the UN during the crisis, as well as preserving Castro and 
secretly getting the American missiles out of Turkey and Italy.157 This included 
undermining the case for preventative nuclear war put forward so forcefully by 
American military figures even after the formal end of the Cuban crisis.158 This 
success both validated Khrushchev’s preaching of peaceful co-existence and 
also helped to negate the nuclear imbalance with the US. 
Despite noting the Soviet concentration on Cuba in the opening weeks of the 
17th Assembly of the UN, the British did not pick up on its significance. 
Nevertheless, once the crisis broke they were acutely aware of its propaganda 
dimensions, not least amongst the non-aligned; hence Home and Dean’s 
concern at US failure to seek UN approval for the quarantine. Acutely aware of 
the growing importance of the non-aligned at the UN, they were also concerned 
to counter moves by these delegations which aimed at ending the quarantine 
without tackling the missiles. The need to steer any response by the Acting 
Secretary-General to such moves was immediately grasped by Home. That there 
was such a need was made clear by U Thant’s opening intervention on 24 
October. As Macmillan rightly observed, this sent ‘a very dangerous message’ 
because it failed to provide for the verifiable removal of the missiles. As Home 
had pointed out to Rodzinski earlier that day, some form of UN inspection was 
needed. Thereafter this line was repeatedly pushed on U Thant by Dean. 
Portrayals of U Thant as an ‘unsung mediator’ have failed to acknowledge the 
extent to which he was responding to pressure from others.159 His initial 
intervention was prompted by a non-aligned group. This might have met their 
fears, but would not have satisfied the Americans. Macmillan and Home, via 
Dean, therefore sought to steer U Thant into a role which offered a verifiable 
solution for both sides. By 27 October this solution, for the British, involved 
observable inoperability of the missiles on the one hand, and the inviolability of 
Cuba on the other, in both cases under UN safeguards. These safeguards 
underpinned the US note verbale which secured the basis of a solution, while at 
Dean’s prompting U Thant acquired an invitation to Cuba to negotiate such 
matters. By such processes, the British modified the Acting Secretary-General’s 
‘dangerous message’ and steered U Thant towards playing a role as mediator. 
Dean praised U Thant’s handling of the crisis, but he himself deserves praise for 
his unsung part in shifting the Acting Secretary-General’s approach. The role U 
Thant was encouraged to play reassured those non-aligned countries suspicious 
of the US while providing an outcome which – unlike that enjoined on the 
Acting Secretary-General by neutrals on 24 October – would satisfy both the 
Americans and Russians, if not the Cubans. In the process, Dean thus helped to 
ensure that this local conflict did not develop into the conflagration Home had 
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